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ABSTRACT
Despite their playful purpose social media changed the way users access information, debate, and form their opinions. Recent
studies, indeed, showed that users online tend to promote their favored narratives and thus to form polarized groups around
a common system of beliefs. Confirmation bias helps to account for users’ decisions about whether to spread content, thus
creating informational cascades within identifiable communities. At the same time, aggregation of favored information within
those communities reinforces selective exposure and group polarization. Along this path, through a thorough quantitative
analysis we approach connectivity patterns over 1.2M of Facebook users engaged with two very conflicting narratives: scientific
and conspiracy news. Analyzing such data, we quantitatively investigate the effect of two mechanisms (namely challenge
avoidance and reinforcement seeking) behind confirmation bias, one of the major drivers of human behavior in social media.
We find that challenge avoidance mechanism triggers the emergence of two distinct and polarized groups of users (i.e., echo
chambers) who also tend to be surrounded by friends having similar systems of beliefs. Through a network based approach,
we show how the reinforcement seeking mechanism limits the influence of neighbors and primarily drives the selection and
diffusion of contents even among like-minded users, thus fostering the formation of highly polarized sub-clusters within the
same echo chamber. Finally, we show that polarized users reinforce their preexisting beliefs by leveraging the activity of their
like-minded neighbors, and this trend grows with the user engagement suggesting how peer influence acts as a support for
reinforcement seeking.
Introduction
Social media facilitated global communications all over the world, allowing information to spread faster and intensively. These
changes led up to the formation of a disintermediated scenario, where contents flow directly from producers to consumers,
without the mediation of journalists or experts in the field. Beyond its undoubted benefits, a hyper-connected world can foster
confusion about causation, and thus encourage speculation, rumors, and mistrust1–4. Since 2013, indeed, the World Economic
Forum (WEF) has been placing the global threat of massive digital misinformation at the core of other technological and
geopolitical risks, ranging from terrorism, to cyber-attacks, up to the failure of global governance5. People are misinformed
when they hold beliefs neglecting factual evidence, and misinformation may influence public opinion negatively. Empirical
investigations have shown that, in general, people tend to resist facts, holding inaccurate factual beliefs confidently6. Moreover,
corrections frequently fail to reduce misperceptions7 and often act as a backfire effect8.
Confirmation bias - i.e., the tendency to seek, select, and interpret information coherently with one’s system of beliefs9 -
helps, indeed, to account for users’ decisions about whether to promote content2, 10–12. The action of this cognitive bias may
lead to the emergence of homogeneous and polarized communities - i.e., echo-chambers13–15, thus facilitating fake news and,
more in general, misinformation cascades3.
According to16, two primary cognitive mechanisms are used to explain why people experience the confirmation bias:
• Challenge avoidance - i.e., the fact that people do not want to find out that they are wrong,
• Reinforcement seeking - i.e., the fact that people want to find out that they are right.
Though the two are strongly related, and though both behaviors revolve around people’s attempt to minimize their
cognitive dissonance - i.e., the psychological stress that people experience when they hold two or more contradictory beliefs
simultaneously, challenge avoidance and reinforcement seeking are not inherently linked to each other, and they do not have to
occur at the same time. This distinction is important because the consequences of challenge avoidance are significantly more
harmful to democratic deliberation than those of reinforcement seeking17. Additionally, group membership has an interplay
with the aforementioned cognitive biases. When individuals belong to a certain group, those outside the group are far less likely
to influence them on both easy and hard questions18.
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In this work, by exploiting the social network of 1.2M of Facebook users engaged with very polarizing contents, we
investigate the role of challenge avoidance and reinforcement seeking on the selection and spread of information, and the
connection of such cognitive mechanisms with peer influence.
To our aim, with the help of very active debunking groups, we identified all the Italian Facebook pages supporting scientific
and conspiracy news, and on a time span of five years (2010-2014) we downloaded all their public posts (with the related
lists of likes and comments). On the one hand, conspiracy news simplify causation, reduce the complexity of reality, and are
formulated in a way that is able to tolerate a certain level of uncertainty19–21. On the other hand, scientific news disseminates
scientific advances and exhibits the process of scientific thinking. Notice that we do not focus on the quality of the information
but rather on the possibility of verification. Indeed, the main difference between the two is content verifiability. The generators
of scientific information and their data, methods, and outcomes are readily identifiable and available. The origins of conspiracy
theories are often unknown and their content is strongly disengaged from mainstream society and sharply divergent from
recommended practices8, e.g., the belief that vaccines cause autism22.
Our analyses show how challenge avoidance mechanism triggers the emergence, around the selected narratives, of two
well-separated and polarized groups of users who also tend to surround themselves with friends having similar systems of
beliefs.
Through a network based approach, we also prove that polarized users span their attention focus on a higher number of
pages (and topics) supporting their beliefs (hereafter referred to as community pages) as their engagement grows, but they tend
to remain confined within groups of very few pages even when the corresponding neighborhoods are active on several news
sources. This suggests that the reinforcement seeking mechanism limits the influence of neighbors and primarily drives the
selection and the diffusion of contents even among like-minded users, fostering the formation of highly polarized subclusters
within the same echo chamber.
Finally, we investigate the effects of the joint action of confirmation bias and peer influence when the latter does not conflict
the cognitive mechanisms of challenge avoidance and reinforcement seeking. Namely, we compare the liking activity of
polarized users and the liking activity of their part of neighborhood likewise polarized, both with respect to size and time. Our
findings reveal that polarized users reinforce their preexisting beliefs by leveraging the activity of their like-minded neighbors.
Such a trend grows with the user engagement and suggests how peer influence acts as a support for reinforcement seeking.
In such a context, also the positive role played by social influence - e.g., by enabling social learning 23–25, seems to lose its
effectiveness in the effort of smoothing polarization and reducing both the risk and the consequences of misinformation. This
makes it even more difficult to design efficient communication strategies to prevent rumors and mistrust. Individual choices
more than algorithms10 seem to characterize the consumption patterns of users and their friends. Therefore, working towards
long-term solutions to polarization and misinformation online cannot be separated from a deep understanding of users’ cognitive
determinants behind these mechanisms.
Methods
Ethics Statement. Approval and informed consent were not needed because the data collection process has been carried out
using the Facebook Graph application program interface (API), which is publicly available. For the analysis (according to the
specification settings of the API) we only used publicly available data (thus users with privacy restrictions are not included
in the dataset). The pages from which we download data are public Facebook entities and can be accessed by anyone. User
content contributing to these pages is also public unless the user’s privacy settings specify otherwise, and in that case it is not
available to us.
Data Collection. Debate about social issues continues to expand across the Web, and unprecedented social phenomena such as
the massive recruitment of people around common interests, ideas, and political visions are emerging. For our analysis, we
identified two main categories of pages: conspiracy news – i.e., pages promoting contents neglected by main stream media –
and science news. We defined the space of our investigation with the support of diverse Facebook groups that are very active
in debunking conspiracy theses. As an additional control, we used the self-description of a page to determine its focus. The
resulting dataset is composed by all the pages supporting the two distinct narratives in the Italian Facebook scenario: 39 about
conspiracy theories and 33 about science news. For the two sets of pages we download all of the posts (and their respective user
interactions) across a 5-y time span (2010–2014). We perform the data collection process by using the Facebook Graph API,
which is publicly available and accessible through any personal Facebook user account. The exact breakdown of the data is
presented in Table 1. Likes and comments have a different meaning from the user viewpoint. Most of the times, a like stands
for a positive feedback to the post and a comment is the way in which online collective debates take form. Comments may
contain negative or positive feedbacks with respect to the post.
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Total Science Conspiracy
Pages 72 33 39
Posts 270,629 62,038 208,591
Likes 9,164,781 2,505,399 6,659,382
Comments 1,017,509 180,918 836,591
Likers 1,196,404 332,357 864,047
Commenters 279,972 53,438 226,534
Table 1. Breakdown of Facebook dataset.
The number of pages, posts, likes and comments for science and conspiracy pages.
Ego Networks. In addition, we collected the ego networks of users who liked at least one post on science or conspiracy pages -
i.e., for each user we have collected her list of friends and the links between them1.
Preliminaries and definitions. LetP be the set of all the pages in our collection, andPscience (Pconspir) be the set of the 33
(39) Facebook pages about science (conspiracy) news. Let V be the set of all the 1.2M users and E the edges representing
their Facebook friendship connections; these sets define a graph G = (V,E). Hence, the graph of likes on a post, GL = (V L,EL)
is the subgraph of G whose users have liked a post. Thus, V L is the set of users of V who have liked at least one post, and
we set EL = {(u,v) ∈ E;u,v ∈V L}. Following previous works2, 3, 26, we study the polarization of users - i.e., the tendency of
users to interact with only a single type of information; in particular, we study the polarization towards science and conspiracy.
Formally we define the polarization ρ(u) ∈ [−1,1] of user u ∈V L as the ratio of likes that u has performed on conspiracy posts:
assuming that u has performed x and y likes on conspiracy and science posts, respectively, we let ρ(u) = (x− y)/(x+ y). Thus,
a user u for whom ρ(u) =−1 is polarized towards science, whereas a user with ρ(u) = 1 is polarized towards conspiracy. Note
that we ignore the commenting activity since a comment may be an endorsement, a criticism, or even a response to a previous
comment. Furthermore, we define the engagement ψ(u) of a polarized user u as her liking activity normalized with respect to
the number of likes of the most active user of her community. By defining θ(u) as the total number of likes that the user u has
expressed in posts ofP , notice that the following condition holds: ψ(u) = θ(u)maxv θ(v) .
The degree of a node (here, user) u, deg(u), is the number of neighbors (here, friends) of u. For any user u, we consider
the partition deg(u) = |Nc(u)|+ |Nne(u)|+ |Nnp(u)|+ |Ns(u)| where Nc(u)(Ns(u)) denotes the neighborhood of u polarized
towards conspiracy (science), Nne(u) denotes the neighborhood of u not engaged with science or conspiracy contents, Nnp(u)
denotes the set of not polarized friends of u - i.e., friends who liked the same number of contents from science and conspiracy,
respectively.
To understand the relationship between pages and user liking activity, we measure the polarization of users with respect to
the pages of their own community. For a polarized user (or, more in general, a group of polarized users) u with ∑i θi(u) = θ(u)
likes, where θi(u) counts the contents liked by u on the ith community page (i = 1, . . . ,N, where N equals the number of
community pages), the probability φi(u) that u belongs to the ith page of the community will then be φi(u) = θi(u)/θ(u). We
can define the localization order parameter L as:
L(u) =
(
∑
i
φ 2i (u)
)2
∑
i
φ 4i (u)
Thus, in the case in which u only has likes in one page, L(u) = 1. If u, on the other hand, interacts equally with all the
community pages (φi(u) = 1/N) then L(u) = N; hence, L(u) counts the community pages where u fairly equally distributes her
liking activity.
List of pages. In this section are listed pages of our dataset. Table 2 shows the list of scientific news and Table 3 shows the list
of conspiracy pages.
Augmented Dickey–Fuller test. An augmented Dickey–Fuller test (ADF) tests the null hypothesis that a unit root is present
in a time series27, 28. The alternative hypothesis is stationarity. If we obtain a p-value less than the threshold value α¯ = 0.05, the
null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative one. ADF is an augmented version of the Dickey–Fuller test29 for a larger
1We used publicly available data, so we collected only data for which the users had the corresponding permissions open.
3/19
set of time series models. We use this test to investigate the stationarity of the time series given by the number of posts per day
published by a community page during its lifetime. The general regression equation which incorporates a constant and a linear
trend is used. The number of lags used in the regression corresponds to the upper bound on the rate at which the number of lags
should be made to grow with the time series size T for the general ARMA(p,q) setup30, and equals T 1/3.
Cosine similarity. Cosine similarity is a measure of similarity between two non-zero vectors u = (u1, . . . ,uk) and v =
(v1, . . . ,vk) of a k-dimensional inner product space expressed by the cosine of the angle between them31. By means of the
Euclidean dot product formula we obtain
cos(u,v) =
u ·v
‖u‖‖v‖ =
k
∑
i=1
uivi√
k
∑
i=1
u2i
√
k
∑
i=1
v2i
.
We use cosine similarity to evaluate whether a polarized user u and the part of her neighborhood with likewise polarization
proportionally distribute their liking activity across her preferred community pages. Namely, for any user u polarized to-
wards science (conspiracy), denoted with {Pi1 , . . . ,Pik}=Puscience (Puconspir) the set of k science (conspiracy) pages where u
distributes her liking activity, we compute the cosine between the vectors (θi1(u), . . . ,θik(u)) and (θi1(Ns(u)), . . . ,θik(Ns(u))),
both normalized with respect to the infinity norm. The space of such versors is positive, then the cosine measure outcome
is neatly bounded in [0,1]: two versors are maximally similar if they are parallel and maximally dissimilar if they are orthogonal.
Akaike Information Criterion. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)32–34 is an asymptotically unbiased estimator of the
expected relative Kullback-Leibler distance (K-L)35, which represents the amount of information lost when we use model g to
approximate model f :
K−L = I( f ,g) =
∫
f (x) log
(
f (x)
g(x |µ)
)
dx2,
where µ = (µ1, . . . ,µk) is the vector of k model parameters. The AIC for a given model is a function of its maximized
log-likelihood (`) and k:
AIC =−2`+2k.
We use the AIC for selecting the optimal lag structure of a Granger causality test.
Granger causality and peer influence probability. The Granger causality test is a statistical hypothesis test for determining
whether one time series is useful in forecasting another36. Roughly speaking, a time series X is said to Granger-cause (briefly,
G-cause) the time series Y if the prediction of Y is improved when X is included in the prediction model of Y . Denoted with
I ∗(τ) the set of all information in the universe up to time τ and with I ∗−X (τ) the same information set except for the values of
series X up to time τ , we write
Yτ+1 |= I ∗(τ) |I ∗−X (τ)
for indicating that X does not cause Y .
Let t(u) be the time series given by the number of likes expressed by a user u polarized towards science onPuscience every day
of her lifetime - i.e., the temporal distance between its first and its last like. Let t(Ns(u)) be the time series of the number of
likes expressed by Ns(u) on the same pages every day in the same time window. We investigate a causal effect of t(Ns(u)) on
t(u) by testing the null hypothesis that the former does not Granger-cause the latter:
H0 := t(u)τ+1 |= I ∗(τ) |I ∗−t(Ns(u))(τ)
through a series of F-tests on lagged values of t(u). The alternative hypothesis H1 is t(Ns(u)) G-cause t(u). The number of lags
to be included is chosen using AIC. If we obtain a p-value α(u) less than the threshold value α¯ = 0.05, the null hypothesis H0
is rejected in favor of H1. The same analysis is carried out for testing a causal effect of t(Nc(u)) on t(u) for any polarized user
u towards conspiracy.
Furthermore, we define the peer influence probability PIPuscience of Ns(u) on u as the rational number in the range [0,1] given
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by the complement of α(u) in the positive space of p-values, that is: PIPuscience = 1−α(u). Values close to 0 indicate low
probability of peer influence, values close to 1 suggest high probability of peer influence. Analogously we define the peer
influence probability PIPuconspir of Nc(u) on u, for any user u polarized towards conspiracy.
Dynamic time warping. Dynamic time warping (DTW) is an algorithm for measuring similarity between two time series X
and Y which computes the optimal (least cumulative distance) alignment between points of X (also said query vector) and Y
(also said reference vector). If X has size n and Y has size m, DTW produces an n×m cost matrix D whose (i, j)-element is the
Euclidean distance d(X i,Y j) where X i and Y j are obtained by stretching in time the vectors (X [1], . . . ,X [i]) and (Y [1], . . . ,Y [ j])
to optimize the best alignment. The value D(n,m) - i.e., the DTW distance between X and Y , is returned37.
We use DTW distance for measuring the similarity between t(u) and t(Ns(u)) (t(Nc(u))) for any user u polarized towards
science (conspiracy).
Results and Discussion
Anatomy of science and conspiracy pages
To ensure the robustness of our analysis about the online behavior of polarized users (i.e., if likes are not trivially distributed
across pages and if data respect the assumptions of the tests described in Methods), we verify the eligibility of the space of our
investigation. Namely we study how likers and their activity are distributed over pages and how pages’ activity is distributed
over time. Figure 1 shows the distribution of likes and likers across scientific and conspiracy news sources, respectively. Plots
shows the ratio likers/likes for every science (left panel) and conspiracy (right panel) page. Points are colored according to the
number of users who liked contents published by the corresponding page (See Table 2 and Table 3 for the list of scientific and
conspiracy news sources, respectively).
Points are mostly localized near the center of the radar chart and, in general, represent the pages with more likers (and more
likes). Moreover, points far from the center correspond to pages with the lowest number of likers and likes. This ensures that a
comparison between the normalized distributions of likes of two like-minded users (or groups of users) across the community
pages is an unbiased estimator of their behavioral difference in terms of liking activity.
Furthermore, in order to investigate how scientific and conspiracy news sources distribute their posting activity over time,
we compute the fraction of days with activity of any page with respect to its lifetime - i.e., the temporal distance between its
first and its last post. Then we perform an augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test for testing the null hypothesis that a unit root
is present in the time series given by the number of posts per day published by a community page during its lifetime. The
alternative hypothesis is stationarity (see Methods for further details). Figure 2 shows the PDF of the fraction of days with
activity per page and the PDF of p-values obtained by performing ADF test for all the pages of science community (left panel)
and all the pages of conspiracy community (right panel), respectively.
Plots indicate that the most pages of both the communities are active with a nearly constant number of posts almost every
day of their lifetime.
Experiencing the confirmation bias: polarization and homophily
Users’ liking activity across contents of the different categories2, 3, 26 may be intended as the preferential attitude towards the
one or the other type of information (documented or not). In Figure 3 we show that the probability density function (PDF) for
the polarization of all the users in V L is a sharply peaked bimodal where the vast majority of users are polarized either towards
science (ρ(u)∼−1) or conspiracy (ρ(u)∼ 1). Hence, Figure 3 shows that most of likers can be divided into two groups of
users, those polarized towards science and those polarized towards conspiracy. To better define the properties of these groups,
we define the set V Lscience of users with polarization more than 95% towards science
V Lscience = {u ∈V L; ρ(u)<−0.95},
and the set V Lconspir of users with polarization more than 95% towards conspiracy
V Lconspir = {u ∈V L; ρ(u)> 0.95};
such sets corresponds to the two peaks of the bimodal distribution and show how the most users are highly polarized:
|V Lscience|= 243,977 and |V Lconspir|= 758,673.
Moreover, for a polarized users u∈V Lscience, in the left panel of Figure 4, we show the log-linear plot of the average fraction of
science pages where u is present with liking activity, respect given number of likes θ of the user u. In the right panel, we show the
same quantities for polarized users in V Lconspir. Figure 4 suggests in both cases a quadratic correlation among the variables; thus,
we check whether for a polarized user u, the fraction of community pages where u spans her liking activity, y(u), can be predicted
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by means of a quadratic regression model where the explanatory variable is a logarithmic transformation of the number of likes
θ(u), i.e. y(u) = β0+β1 logθ(u)+β2 log2 θ(u). Using the notation introduced in Methods, it is y(u) = |Puscience|/|Pscience|
for u ∈V Lscience and y(u) = |Puconspir|/|Pconspir| for u ∈V Lconspir. Coefficients are estimated using weighted least squares with
weights given by the total number of users per engagement value and they are – with the corresponding standard errors
inside the round brackets - β0 = 0.0669(0.0011), β1 = 0.2719(0.0137) and β2 = 0.0419(0.0040), with r2 = 0.7133, for users
polarized towards science, and β0 = 0.1229(0.0014), β1 = 0.9023(0.0195) and β2 = 0.1629(0.0054), with r2 = 0.8876, for
users polarized towards conspiracy. All the p-values are close to zero.
Summarizing, we find that the consumption of polarizing contents is dominated by confirmation bias through the mechanism
of challenge avoidance: users polarized towards a narrative tend to consume nearly exclusively content adhering to their
system of beliefs, thereby minimizing their cognitive dissonance. Indeed, as their engagement grows, polarized users span their
attention focus over a higher number of pages (and topics) keeping consistence with their behavioral attitude.
By exploiting the social network of polarized users and their friends, we investigate the role of reinforcement seeking
mechanism in the homophily driven choice of friends on Facebook - i.e., the tendency of users to aggregate around common
interests. Figure 5 shows the fraction of friends of polarized users as a function of their engagement ψ(·) both in the case
of users in V Lscience and in the case of users in V
L
conspir. Plots suggest that users not only tend to be very polarized, but they
also tend to be linked to users with similar preferences. This is more evident among conspiracists where, for a polarized user
u, the fraction of friends v with likewise polarization is very high (& 0.62) and grows with the engagement ψ up to & 0.87.
The neighborhood of a polarized scientific user u tends to be more heterogeneous, but the fraction of friends with likewise
polarization of u grows stronger with the engagement ψ (from & 0.30 up to & 0.66). Furthermore, Figure 5 clearly indicates
that the neighborhood of users engaged with polarizing contents (verified or not) is almost completely polarized as well
(74−80% for science users and 72−90% of conspiracy users). The fact that highly polarized users have friends exhibiting an
opposite polarization is a direct evidence of the challenge avoidance mechanism: contents promoted by friends which contrast
one’s worldview are ignored.
Summarizing, we find that the activity of a user on a polarizing content increases the probability to have friends with similar
characteristics. Such information is a precious insight toward the understanding of information diffusion. Indeed, a previous
work has shown that users usually exposed to undocumented claims (e.g., conspiracy stories) are the most likely to confuse
intentional false information as usual conspiracy stories3.
Engagement, friends and shared news sources
Looking at the self-description of the news sources, several distinct targets emerge both between science pages and between
conspiracy pages (see Table 2 and Table 3, respectively). This calls for a distinction between friends of a polarized user u
who share with u a similar polarization resulting by liking contents of the same community and friends of u who actually like
contents promoted by the same pages supported by u. In other words, in the first case the user u and her neighbourhood are
grouped together at community-level (they have same/similar polarization but they like different pages); in the second case the
user u and her neighbourhood are grouped together at page-level (they like not only pages in the same community but they are
also somewhat active on the same set of pages).
For a polarized scientific user u ∈V Lscience, in the left panel of Figure 6, we show the log-linear plot of the average fraction y
of friends v ∈V Lscience with liking activity on the community pages liked by u, respect given number of likes θ of the user u. In
the right panel, we show the same quantities for polarized conspiracy users in V Lconspir. Figure 6 suggests in both cases a linear
correlation among the variables; thus, we check whether for a polarized user u, the fraction of friends in her category who
like contents from the community pages preferred by u, y(u), can be predicted by means of a linear regression model where
the explanatory variable is a logarithmic transformation of the number of likes θ(u), i.e. y(u) = β0+β1 logθ(u). Coefficients
are estimated using weighted least squares with weights given by the total number of users per engagement value and they
are – with the corresponding standard errors inside the round brackets – β0 = 0.4062(0.0007) and β1 = 0.0869(0.0012), with
r2 = 0.8744, for users polarized towards science; β0 = 0.3582(0.0007) and β1 = 0.1501(0.0012), with r2 = 0.9413, for users
polarized towards conspiracy. All the p-values are close to zero. This suggests that polarized users not only tend to surround
themselves with friends having similar systems of beliefs, but they actually share with them the involvement within the same
community pages.
Confirmation bias as a filter to peer influence
Here we study the liking activity of polarized users in more detail by measuring how they span such activity across the various
community pages. For science (conspiracy) community, Figure 7 shows the probability distribution of the localization L along
the user set and along the neighborhood set, and the relationship between L(u) and L(Ns(u)) (L(Nc(u))) for each science
(conspiracy) user u.
For each polarized user u, we observe a positive correlation between these two order parameters: Pearson’s correlation
coefficient rL(u),L(Ns(u)) ∼ 0.5962 with p-value ∼ 10−7 for science community, Pearson’s correlation coefficient rL(u),L(Nc(u)) ∼
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0.5935 with p-value ∼ 10−9 for conspiracy community. Nevertheless, the most users remain confined within groups of very
few pages even with neighborhoods fairly active on several news sources. Moreover, the inset plots of Figure 7 show on a
logarithmic x scale the relation of θ(u) with L(u) and L(Ns(u)) (L(Nc(u))), respectively, for each u ∈V Lscience (V Lconspir). Full
lines are the results of a linear regression model whose coefficients are estimated using weighted least squares with weights
given by the total number of users per engagement value.
By investigating the self-description of the news sources, we also find that the most users who decide to span their liking
activity over a higher number of pages, choose pages dealing with very interlinked topics (& 76% of science users and & 69%
of conspiracy users). Such an evidence suggests that the reinforcement seeking mechanism limits the influence of neighbors
and primarily drives the selection and the diffusion of contents even within groups of like-minded people.
Peer support and reinforcement of preexisting beliefs
So far we have shown how confirmation bias acts as filter to peer influence. In this Section, we investigate the effects of the joint
action of confirmation bias and peer influence when the latter does not conflict the cognitive mechanisms of challenge avoidance
and reinforcement seeking. Namely, we first compare the liking activity of each polarized user across her preferred community
pages with the liking activity expressed on the same pages by the part of her neighborhood with likewise polarization. Then we
compare the daily time series given by the number of likes expressed by a polarized user and her like-minded neighborhood,
respectively, and we investigate the existence of a causal effect of the latter on the former.
For any polarized user u∈V Lscience we compute the cosine between the versors uˆ= u|u| and N̂s(u) = Ns(u)|Ns(u)| where u and Ns(u)
are the vectors whose kth component is the number of likes expressed by u and Ns(u) on the kth page ofPuscience, respectively
(see Methods for further details). The same quantities are calculated for any polarized user u ∈V Lconspir. Figure 8 shows the level
of proportionality between the distributions of liking activity of u and Ns(u) (Nc(u)) across the pages ofPuscience (P
u
conspir),
respectively, versus the number of likes log2(θ(u)) of user u. Segments represent the average of the cosine measurements
regarding users with a liking activity in the range of the corresponding bin (one of 1,2,(2,4],(4,8],(8,16], . . . ), and they are
colored according to the total numbers of users belonging to such a range.
The plots show that a polarized user and her likewise polarized neighborhood distribute their likes across her community
pages in a similar way, both in science (left panel) and conspiracy (right panel) community. Moreover, except a nearly constant
early pattern for conspiracy users, this trend grows with the user engagement suggesting how peer influence acts as a support
for reinforcement seeking. Such an interpretation is pointed out more clearly by comparing the temporal evolution of the liking
activity of a polarized user and her likewise polarized neighborhood, respectively.
In order to carry out such an analysis we restrict the observations to those polarized users u who exhibit a liking activity
large enough to allow the comparison between the time series of likes per day expressed by u and her likewise polarized
neighborhood, respectively. Namely we define
V Lscience = {u ∈V Lscience |θ(u)≥ θ science},
where θ science = 13 is the average number of total likes expressed by a user of V Lscience, and
V Lconspir = {u ∈V Lconspir |θ(u)≥ θ conspir},
where θ conspir = 12 is the average number of total likes expressed by a user of V Lconspir. Furthermore, let t(u) and t(Ns(u))
(t(Nc(u))) be the time series of likes per day expressed overPuscience (P
u
conspir) by a user u ∈ V
L
science (u ∈ V Lconspir) and her
likewise polarized neighborhood, respectively. We estimate the temporal similarity between the liking activity of u and Ns(u)
(Nc(u)) by measuring the DTW distance d(t(Ns(u)), t(u)) (d(t(Nc(u)), t(u))) (see Methods for further details). Figure 9 shows
the PDF of such distances for science users (left panel) and conspiracy users (right panel). In both cases we can observe that
the most users produce a daily time series of likes very similar to that produced by the likes of their likewise neighborhood.
Moreover, the inset plots show the strong positive correlation (Pearson’s coefficient & 0.9887 and & 0.9886 for science and
conspiracy, respectively, with both p-values close to zero) between difference in size of u liking activity compare to Ns(u)
(Nc(u)) and the corresponding DTW distance, suggesting that extreme DTW distances are due to the almost perfect uphill
linear relationship more than to an effective temporal dissimilarity between liking activities.
For each science user in V Lscience, we also investigate a causal effect of t(Ns(u)) on t(u) by testing the null hypothesis that
the former is Granger-noncausal for the latter, namely H0 := t(u)τ+1 |= I ∗(τ) |I ∗−t(Ns(u))(τ). The alternative hypothesis H1 is
predictive causality. The same analysis is repeated for each conspiracy user in V Lconspir (see Methods for further details). In both
panels of Figure 10 we show the PDF of p-values obtained by performing such Granger causality tests. The inset plots show the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the same quantities. Graphics show that the null hypothesis can be rejected as false:
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p-values less than the threshold α¯ = 0.05 are more likely than the others in both the communities and represent ∼ 29% and
∼ 34% of the total in science and conspiracy, respectively.
As an example, Figure 11 shows the daily time series of a selected user u ∈ V Lscience with θ(u) = 767 (left panel) and a
selected user v ∈V Lconspir with θ(v) = 488 (right panel) compared with the daily time series of their neighborhood part Ns(u)
and Nc(v) who have expressed 779 and 919 likes, respectively. For the pair of time series (t(Ns(u)), t(u)), DTW returns a
distance equal to 407 and the Granger causality test a p-value ∼ 10−4. For the pair of time series (t(Nc(v)), t(v)), DTW returns
a distance equal to equal to 463 and the Granger causality test a p-value ∼ 10−5.
Finally, for each polarized user u ∈V Lscience, we study the relationship between predictive causality of t(Ns(u)) on t(u) and
the engagement of u. To this aim we use the peer influence probability PIPuscience (see Methods for further details) that provides
a measure of neighbors influence effectiveness in reinforcing the system of beliefs of u. The same analysis is carried out for any
polarized user u ∈V Lconspir. Figure 12 shows the peer influence probability of u versus the number of likes log2(θ(u)) of u both
in science (left panel) and conspiracy (right panel) community. Segments represent the average of peer influence probabilities
regarding users with a liking activity in the range of the corresponding bin, and they are colored according to the total numbers
of users involved in such a range.
Plots show how, in both communities, polarized users reinforce their preexisting beliefs by leveraging the activity of their
like-minded neighbors, and this trend grows with the user engagement suggesting how peer influence acts as a support for
reinforcement seeking.
Conclusions
In this paper we studied the effects of confirmation bias experience on the spreading of information in a social network of 1.2M
of users engaged with two very distinct and conflicting narratives on Facebook.
Our analyses showed the action of challenge avoidance mechanism in the emergence, around the selected narratives, of two
well-separated and polarized groups of users (i.e., echo chambers) who also tend to be surrounded by friends having similar
systems of beliefs.
Furthermore, we explored the hypothesis that such a pattern is recursive within a single echo chamber. Despite a shared way
of thinking, we proved how during social interactions the strength of confirmation bias is stronger than one could think, leading
the action of peer influence into its service and fostering the formation of highly polarized subclusters within the same echo
chamber. The fact that polarized users tend to remain confined within groups of very few pages even when the corresponding
neighborhoods are active on several news sources, suggests that the reinforcement seeking mechanism limits the influence of
neighbors and primarily drives the selection and the diffusion of contents even within groups of like-minded people.
Finally, we investigated the effects of the joint action of confirmation bias and peer influence when this latter does not
conflict the cognitive mechanisms of challenge avoidance and reinforcement seeking. Namely, we compared the liking activity
of polarized users and the liking activity of their likewise polarized neighborhood, and we test a causal effect of the latter on
the former. Our findings revealed that polarized users reinforce their preexisting beliefs by leveraging the activity of their
like-minded neighbors, and this trend grows with the user engagement suggesting how peer influence acts as a support for
reinforcement seeking.
In such a context, also the positive role played by social influence - e.g., by enabling social learning, seems to lose its
effectiveness in the effort to smooth polarization and reduce misinformation risk and its consequences. This makes it even more
difficult to design efficient communication strategies to prevent rumors and mistrust.
Internet and social media are the ideal ground for the spread of misinformation to speed up, but individual choices more than
algorithms characterise the consumption patterns of users and their friends. Therefore, working towards long-term solutions for
these challenges can not be separated from a deep understanding of users’ cognitive determinants behind these phenomena.
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Page name Facebook ID
1 Scientificast.it 129133110517884
2 CICAP 32775139194
3 OggiScienza 106965734432
4 Query 128523133833337
5 Gravità Zero 138484279514358
6 COELUM Astronomia 81631306737
7 MedBunker 246240278737917
8 In Difesa della Sperimentazione Animale 365212740272738
9 Italia Unita per la Scienza 492924810790346
10 Scienza Live 227175397415634
11 La scienza come non l’avete mai vista 230542647135219
12 LIBERASCIENZA 301266998787
13 Scienze Naturali 134760945225
14 Perché vaccino 338627506257240
15 Le Scienze 146489812096483
16 Vera scienza 389493082245
17 Scienza in rete 84645527341
18 Galileo, giornale di scienza e problemi globali 94897729756
19 Scie Chimiche: Informazione Corretta 351626174626
20 Complottismo? No grazie 399888818975
21 INFN - Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare 45086217578
22 Signoraggio: informazione corretta 279217954594
23 Scetticamente 146529622080908
24 Vivisezione e Sperimentazione Animale, verità e menzogne 548684548518541
25 Medici Senza Frontiere 65737832194
26 Task Force Pandora 273189619499850
27 VaccinarSI 148150648573922
28 Lega Nerd 165086498710
29 Super Quark 47601641660
30 Curiosità Scientifiche 595492993822831
31 Minerva - Associazione di Divulgazione Scientifica 161460900714958
32 Pro-Test Italia 221292424664911
33 Uniti per la Ricerca 132734716745038
Table 2. Scientific news sources.
List of Facebook pages diffusing main stream scientific news.
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Figure 1. Distribution of likes and likers across the community pages. Plots shows the ratio likers/likes for any Science
(left panel) and Conspiracy (right panel) page. Points are colored according to the number of users who liked contents published
by the corresponding page (See Table 2 and Table 3 for the list of scientific and conspiracy news sources, respectively).
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Figure 2. The most pages are active with a nearly constant number of posts almost every day of their lifetime, both in
science and conspiracy community. Plots show the PDF of the fraction of days with activity per page and the PDF of
p-values obtained by performing ADF stationarity test for all the pages, both in science (left panel) and conspiracy (right panel)
community.
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Page name Facebook ID
34 Scienza di Confine 188189217954979
35 CSSC - Cieli Senza Scie Chimiche 253520844711659
36 STOP ALLE SCIE CHIMICHE 199277020680
37 Vaccini Basta 233426770069342
38 Tanker Enemy 444154468988487
39 SCIE CHIMICHE 68091825232
40 MES Dittatore Europeo 194120424046954
41 Lo sai 126393880733870
42 AmbienteBio 109383485816534
43 Eco(R)esistenza 203737476337348
44 curarsialnaturale 159590407439801
45 La Resistenza 256612957830788
46 Radical Bio 124489267724876
47 Fuori da Matrix 123944574364433
48 Graviola Italia 130541730433071
49 Signoraggio.it 278440415537619
50 Informare Per Resistere 101748583911
51 Sul Nuovo Ordine Mondiale 340262489362734
52 Avvistamenti e Contatti 352513104826417
53 Umani in Divenire 195235103879949
54 Nikola Tesla - il SEGRETO 108255081924
55 Teletrasporto 100774912863
56 PNL e Ipnosi 150500394993159
57 HAARP - controllo climatico 117166361628599
58 Sezione Aurea, Studio di Energia Vibrazionale 113640815379825
59 PER UNA NUOVA MEDICINA 113933508706361
60 PSICOALIMENTARSI E CURARSI NATURALMENTE 119866258041409
61 La nostra ignoranza è la LORO forza. 520400687983468
62 HIV non causa AIDS 121365461259470
63 Sapere è un Dovere 444729718909881
64 V per Verità 223425924337104
65 Genitori veg 211328765641743
66 Operatori di luce 195636673927835
67 Coscienza Nuova 292747470828855
68 Aprite Gli Occhi 145389958854351
69 Neovitruvian 128660840526907
70 CoscienzaSveglia 158362357555710
71 Medicinenon 248246118546060
72 TERRA REAL TIME 208776375809817
Table 3. Conspiracy news sources.
List of Facebook pages diffusing conspiracy news.
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Figure 3. Polarization on contents. PDF of the frequency that a user has polarization ρ is remarkably concentrated in two
peaks near the values ρ =−1 (science) and ρ = 1 (conspiracy). This indicates that users are clearly split into two distinct
communities.
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Figure 4. Polarized users span their attention focus on more news sources (and topics) as their engagement grows,
but always keeping consistence with their way of thinking. Left panel: users polarized towards science. Right panel: users
polarized towards conspiracy. In both panels we plot the average fraction of the total number of community pages where a
polarized user u distributes her liking activity versus the number of likes logθ(u) of u. Full lines are the results of a quadratic
regression model y = β0+β1 logθ(u)+β2 log2 θ(u), where y = |Puscience|/|Pscience| for u ∈V Lscience and
y = |Puconspir|/|Pconspir| for u ∈V Lconspir. Coefficients are estimated using weighted least squares with weights given by the
total number of users per engagement value. In both cases, all the p-values are close to zero.
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Figure 5. Users not only tend to be very polarized, but they also tend to be linked to users with similar preferences.
Fraction of neighbors as a function of the engagement ψ . For a polarized science supporter u, the fraction of friends v with the
likewise polarization significantly grows with the engagement ψ from & 0.30 to & 0.66. For a polarized conspiracy supporter
u, the fraction of friends v with likewise polarization is very high (& 0.62) and grows with the engagement ψ up to & 0.87 for
the most engaged users. A user is labelled as “Not polarized” if she liked the same number of posts from Science pages and
Conspiracy pages, respectively. A user is labelled as “Not engaged” if she has no liking activity on the pages of our dataset.
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Figure 6. The fractions of science (conspiracy) friends with liking activity on the community pages liked by any given
science (conspiracy) user. Left panel: users polarized towards science. Right panel: users polarized towards conspiracy. In
both panels, for a polarized user u, we plot the average fraction of polarized friends with likewise polarization of u who like
contents promoted by the same pages supported by u versus the number of likes logθ(u) of u. Full lines are the results of a
linear regression model y(u) = β0+β1 logθ(u). Coefficients are estimated using weighted least squares with weights given by
the total number of users per engagement value. In both cases, all the p-values are close to zero.
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Figure 7. Users tend to remain confined within groups of very few pages even when the corresponding
neighborhoods are active on several news sources. For both the communities, plots show the PDF of the localization of a
polarized user u and the localization of her polarized neighborhood, and the relationship between these two order parameters.
The inset plots show on a logarithmic x scale the relation of θ(u) with L(u) and L(Ns(u)) (L(Nc(u))), respectively, for any
u ∈V Lscience (V Lconspir). Full lines are the results of a linear regression model whose coefficients are estimated using weighted
least squares with weights given by the total number of users per engagement value.
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Figure 8. The distribution of likes of a polarized user across her community pages is proportional to the distribution
of likes expressed on the same news sources by her neighborhood part with likewise polarization. In the left panel, for
any user u ∈V Lscience, we show the cosine similarity between the vectors u and Ns(u) whose kth component is the number of
likes expressed by u and Ns(u) on the kth page ofPuscience, respectively, versus the number of likes log2(θ(u)). Segments
represent the average of the cosine measurements regarding users with a liking activity in the range of the corresponding bin.
The right panel shows the same quantities for polarized users in V Lconspir.
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Figure 9. The most users produce a daily time series of likes very similar to the one produced on the same pages by
the likes of their respective likewise neighborhood. Left panel: scientific polarized users. Right panel: conspiracy polarized
users. PDF of Dynamic time warping (DTW) distance between the daily time series of likes expressed by a polarized user and
her likewise polarized neighborhood, respectively. The inset plots show the almost perfect correlation between the difference of
liking amount and the corresponding DTW distance, suggesting that extreme DTW distances are due to this factor more than to
effective temporal dissimilarity between liking activities.
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Figure 10. The causal effect of the polarized neighborhood liking activity on the temporal distribution of likes of a
polarized user. PDF of p-values of Granger causality tests performed for investigating a causal effect of t(Ns(u)) (t(Nc(u)))
on t(u) for any science user in V Lscience (left panel) and any conspiracy user in V
L
conspir (right panel). The inset plots show the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the same quantities. Graphics show that the null hypothesis H0 can be rejected as
false.
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Figure 11. Time series of likes per day expressed by a selected science user u and by a selected conspiracy user v
compared with the daily time series of likes of their neighborhood part Ns(u) and Nc(v), respectively. To the pair of
time series (t(Ns(u)), t(u)) correspondes a DTW distance of 407 and a Granger p-value ∼ 10−4 (left panel). To the pair of time
series (t(Nc(v)), t(v)) correspondes a DTW distance of 463 and a Granger p-value ∼ 10−5 (right panel).
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Figure 12. Polarized users reinforce their preexisting beliefs through the influence of their like-minded neighbors. In
the left panel, for any user u ∈V Lscience, we show the peer influence probability PIPuscience of Ns(u) on u across the pages of
Puscience, versus the number of likes log2(θ(u)). Segments represent the average of peer influence probabilities regarding users
with a liking activity in the range of the corresponding bin. The right panel shows the same quantities for polarized users in
V Lconspir.
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